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(2006). I Introduction
"We may readily conceive that a people should say, "There ought to be no war among us, for we
want to make ourselves into a state; that is, we want to establish a supreme legislative, executive, and
judiciary power which will reconcile our di®erences peaceably." But when this state says, "There ought
to be no war between myself and other states, even though I acknowledge no supreme legislative power
by which our rights are mutually guaranteed," it is not at all clear on what I can base my con¯dence
in my own rights unless it is the free federation, the surrogate of the civil social order, which reason
necessarily associates with the concept of the law of nations assuming that something is really meant
by the latter." Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, 1795.
"Through the consolidation of basic production and the institution of a new High Authority, whose
decisions will bind France, Germany and the other countries that join, this proposal represents the
¯rst concrete step towards a European federation, imperative for the preservation of peace." Robert
Schuman, French Foreign Minister, 9 mai 1950, Paris.
The huge and increasing amount of regional trading arrangements (RTAs), - as of September 2006,
156 RTAs noti¯ed to the WTO under Enabling Close and GATT Art. XXIV were in force -, has
attracted a large amount of papers, focusing in particular on their trade creating/trade diverting
e®ects and their impact on welfare and the multilateral trade liberalization path. This body of lit-
erature generally assumes regionalism as a gradual process. As putted by Balassa (1961), RTAs can
be classi¯ed from the least integrated to the more integrated, as a step by step approach to economic
union, through free trade area, custom union and common market. The implicit assumption behind
is that more integrated arrangements provide deeper economic integration. Empirical support for a
larger e®ect on trade of more integrated agreements are however lacking.1 Yet a concomitant, less
regarded, of the growing number of trade agreements is their increasingly di®erent features around
the world. They range from the simple exchange of preferences on a limited number of products to
the elimination of almost all tari® barriers and beyond the harmonization of standards and rules on
services, intellectual property rights and competition. Accordingly, the latter involves the creation
of supranational institutions whose decisions bind signatory countries, like in the EU. This suggests
that regional trading agreements are not homogeneous in their nature, in particular in the degree of
political integration they entail. Sharing common external tari®s or the harmonization of standards or
common competition policies indeed necessitate to create common institutions and to provide public
goods at the regional level. On the contrary, if only a reduction of tari®s is at stake, a weak institu-
tional framework is su±cient. This question of the form regional integration takes in di®erent regions
of the world has however barely been investigated. This relates to the relationship between economic
and political integration, a criteria which seems more relevant to characterize di®erent RTAs. RTAs
should be understood as much as a process lowering barriers to trade than as a regulation institution
for trade and more broadly interstate relations.2
1Most studies do not even distinguish RTAs according to their degree of integration, and investigate their e®ects
either on a case by case basis or assuming them as homogeneous. An exception is Ghosh and Yamarik (2004b), whose
results do not support any signi¯cantly larger intra-regional trade creating e®ect of more integrated RTAs.
2World Bank (2005) indeed shows that if one third of global trade takes place under RTAs, only half of these °ows
really bene¯ts from tari® preferences (because of zero MFN rates and trade facing tari®s of 3% or less, which is not
meaningful).In this respect, an important and rather ignored facet of regionalism is the insecurity issue. Histor-
ically, several regional integration processes, such as the European Union3 and Mercosur, however
refer explicitly to security concerns (World Bank, 2000). The argument generally put ahead, initially
developed by liberals such as Montesquieu or Kant (Barbieri, 2002), is that increasing trade ties would
inhibit intra-regional military con°icts. This is especially relevant at the regional level, where countries
are most concerned by both economic integration and military threats. Less emphasized, the insti-
tutional dimension of regional integration is however particularly relevant to the security issue. By
favoring early settlement of con°ict at supranational level (thus avoiding the politization of con°icts),
institutions creating along with RTAs are likely to prevent escalation of disputes to war. Institutional
frameworks greatly di®er according to the depth of the RTAs created. Accordingly, their e®ect on
international insecurity would vary. As such, it should enter the decision of countries to form a regional
trading agreement and especially its features because it shapes the security externality.
The question addressed in this paper is thus twofold: how insecurity and trade interplay in RTA
formation and further which countries are likely to create which kind of RTA. These questions are
investigated both empirically and theoretically in a framework where trade is mutually bene¯cial and
countries face appropriation possibilities, which can be resolved peacefully or through war. Inter-
national insecurity is found to foster regional integration only to the extent that its pacifying e®ect
exceeds the potential additional costs related to greater dyadic dependence. It suggests that eco-
nomic determinants of free trade agreements emphasized by Baier and Bergstrand (2004) should be
extended. Furthermore, provided that the degree of political integration embedded in RTAs shapes
their pacifying e®ect, this result allows to handle an important open question, which is to understand
why di®erent types of RTAs are created in di®erent regions of the world. We test empirically the theo-
retically derived determinants of di®erent types of RTAs. It is found that RTAs involving a signi¯cant
degree of political integration, such as custom union (CU) or common market (CM), are more likely to
be created between countries experiencing disputes, whereas international insecurity deters free trade
areas (FTA) and preferential arrangements (PA).
A large body of literature in political science has put forward that war and trade are interrelated
(see Mans¯eld and Pollins (2004) for a survey)4. Trade interdependence has however two meanings.
First, two countries are considered interdependent if it would be costly for both of them to forego
their relationships, as is the case if a country cannot easily substitute its imports from a given partner.
Second, a group of countries is considered interdependent if economic conditions in one are contingent
on those found in the others (Mans¯eld and Pollins, 2004). Depending on which conception of inter-
dependence prevails, the e®ect of trade on war would di®er. Based on a theoretical model of con°ict
under asymmetric information, Martin et al. (2005) ¯nd strong empirical evidences of this ambivalent
impact of trade: bilateral trade does deter war but multilateral trade dependence has the opposite
e®ect, as it loosens bilateral interdependence. They conclude that policies a®ecting the geography of
trade, such as RTAs, would also a®ect interdependence, and thus international security. Regionalism
3For instance, the preamble to the Paris Treaty of 1951 establishing the European Coal and Steel Community "resolved
to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential interest; to create, by establishing an economic community,
the basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody con°icts."
4Their argument mostly relies on an opportunity cost analysis. Because states sharing economic linkages bene¯t
from it, war, which is said to disrupt those linkages, is costly. Hence the prospect of higher war cost is said to deter
economically interdependent states from resorting to violence to solve their disputes.
2however not only provide for trade preferences. It also embeds some degree of political integration
and the creation of common institutions, in order to ex-ante negotiate the rules and ex-post control
their implementation and application. Regional integration involve the provision of some public goods
at the regional level, and possibly the creation of supranational institutions limiting sovereignty of
state members. The institutional framework created and its degree of supranationalism greatly di®er
according to the kind of RTA, in particular because institutions are necessary as a regulation mecha-
nism to render a given level of economic integration sustainable. Thus, creating a custom union (CU)
necessitate to agree on a common external tari® and revenue distribution between state members. A
common market (CM) would necessitate more complete political institutions to agree on a broader
set of issues (harmonization of regulation and standards, free movement of goods and factors,...)5,
whereas a free trade agreement (FTA) involves a weak institutional framework and a limited political
integration.6 Accordingly, the depth of regional integration is de¯ned in this paper in relation with
the level of political integration.
Institutions created along the integration process are designed to manage disputes, and as such likely
to favor a peaceful resolution of con°icts.7 They favor early settlement of disputes at supra-national
level, with dispute settlement mechanisms for instance, but also create room for discussion and negoti-
ation between governments or administrations (Bearce, 2003). This latter channel favors exchange of
information and thus the disclosing of resolve and willingness to take risk by countries pertaining to the
same RTA, thus reducing the degree of asymmetric information and limiting escalation probabilities.
Regular meetings of high-level policymakers also create trust among them, which facilitate credible
commitments by governments and thus act as an enforcement mechanism. These institutions reduce
the degree of anarchy prevailing in interstates relationships. Thereby, only RTAs involving signi¯cant
political integration, such as CU or CM, would actually manage disputes and inhibit their escalation
to war, out of any trade e®ect8. The respective pacifying e®ect of political versus trade integration
has nevertheless barely been assessed9. Bearce and Omori (2005) and Haftel (Forthcoming) are ex-
ceptions and suggest that economic integration per see does not reduce war probabilities, but some
kinds of institutional integration do. These papers do not account for variations in interstate dispute
occurrence, and do not link institutional and economic integration. Yet, the design and the scope
of regional institutions are linked to the choice of di®erent kinds of trade integration. More broadly,
it relates to the question of the extent to which di®erent RTAs o®er a regulation mechanism for the
5See for instance Alesina and Wacziarg (1999) for a detailed mapping of policy areas carried out at the EU level, and
Bouzas and Soltz (2000) concerning the institutional framework of MERCOSUR.
6The ASEAN free trade agreement provides an illustrative example, with weak regional institutions in order to limit
any supranationalism (Best, 2005). Pomfret (1997) also emphasizes how the will to limit political integration has been
incidental to the creation of NAFTA.
7This pacifying e®ect of political integration is related to the third leg of the "Kantian tripod": international law and
organization. Together with international trade and democracy, it would lead to "perpetual peace among states".
8This argument is partly opposed to Schi® (2004), which rests on historical cases to document his hypothesis that
regional wars can arise from distributional issues inside RTAs. He argues that custom unions (CU), especially between
heterogeneous countries, can translate into con°icts because of an unequal distribution of gains and losses from trade
policies among members or because ¯rms agglomerate in one country, bene¯ting one member and hurting the other. In
fact, because it implies more gains from integration and hence more distributional issues among members, Schi® (2004)
assumes that a more integrated regional agreement, like CU, is more likely to lead to war. This argument follows the
same line as the one developed by Grieco (1990) on the globalization / war nexus, who argues that trade liberalization
creates gains whose unequal distribution may lead to con°icts.
9This question is particularly relevant in our framework because the trade creating e®ect of RTA is questioned by
numerous studies (Ghosh and Yamarik, 2004a).
3intertwined international economic and political relations.
The decision to form a RTA is modeled in order to account for the interplays between security10
and trade at the regional level. The model rests on insights from both the con°ict literature11 and
the recent political economy literature on political (dis)integration12. The latter shows how, because
large countries bene¯t from a market size advantage (Alesina et al., 2000) or a scale advantage in
defense (Alesina and Spolaore, Forthcoming), international trade openness or international insecurity
determine the number and size of countries. The model presented here is based on the framework
developed in Alesina and Spolaore (2003, Chapter 8) in which security and trade issues are simultane-
ously introduced13. It thus allows to di®erentiate between di®erent kinds of regional integration, and
to highlight their di®erent determinants. The main features of the model are the followings. Regional
integration provides a market size advantage, which is decreasing with multilateral openness. On the
other side, countries experience disputes with their neighbors on some of their income, which can be
resolved peacefully or through war. These models of trade and war are then embedded in a model of
political integration, in which war entails the disruption of bilateral trade. By favoring trade among
members, RTAs are thus found to prevent dispute escalation to war. And this pacifying e®ect is shaped
by political institutions created along with market integration. In the end, RTA formation is endoge-
nously determined by the degree of multilateral openness, the degree of insecurity, and heterogeneity
costs associated with integration, i.e. geographic and cultural closeness. Only the more politically
integrated RTAs are found to be positively associated with dispute occurrence, whereas agreements
not providing enough security externalities are deterred by insecurity between two countries.
This theoretical result is tested empirically on a wide sample of countries over the 1948-2001 period,
using a dataset computing 55 regional agreements and data on interstates political and military con-
°icts compiled by political scientists. First, using a censored probit model accounting for selection
allows us to econometrically model each stage of the con°ict process and disentangle the impact of
each determinant on con°ict initiation and escalation. We can thus con¯rm the idea that only deep
RTAs, such as customs union and common market, inhibit dispute escalation to war out of any par-
ticular potential trade creating e®ect. We then turn to the ¯nal result of our theoretical model. After
controlling for the endogeneity of dispute occurrence, it is found that the more integrated RTAs, such
as CU and CM, are signi¯cantly more likely to be created between countries experiencing more in-
terstate disputes. The opposite is true concerning shallow RTAs such as PA and FTA. The shadow
of con°ict is found to shape the institutional design of international agreements like RTAs. Rather
than the actual use of military force, the very nature of the interstate system, where no supra-national
institution hold the monopoly of legitimate violence, makes disputes occurrence likely to determine
the form of regionalism in di®erent regions of the world, because disputes occur under the threat of
military force.
10Schi® and Winters (1997) is the only attempt to integrate security issues in RTA theory. They show that if bilateral
trade provides a security externality, regionalism could maximize welfare and be a ¯rst-best equilibrium. Con°icts are
however not modeled and they do not distinguish between di®erent kind of regional integration.
11See Hirschleifer (1988) for an introduction on how con°icts can shape economic activity.
12See Ruta (2005) and Bolton et al. (1996) for a review of the literature.
13Spolaore (2004) distinguishes two di®erent policy areas which however both take place at the national level. He thus
investigates the impact of the interplays between security and economic factors on the size distribution of countries.
4This paper thus signi¯cantly contributes to existing literature on at least three points. First, it
is the ¯rst to investigate, both theoretically and empirically, how the interplays between trade and
con°icts can shape RTAs. It thus explicitly de¯ne regionalism not only as a tari®s-eliminating process
but also in its regulation role. Finally, a ¯rst empirical assessment to the question of the di®erent type
of RTAs signed in di®erent regions of the world is given.
The rest of the paper is constructed as follows. The next section presents the theoretical model of
regional integration in an insecure international system. Section 3 presents data and econometric
results on the e®ects of RTAs on war and the determinants of each kind of RTA. The last section
concludes the paper.
II A model of regional integration in the shadow of con°ict
We consider a world where a discrete number of homogeneous countries interacts in an insecure world.
Governments have to decide their foreign policy on matters of both economic/trade and security, i.e.
to choose their defense capabilities and whether or not to enter a RTA, given that:
² entering a RTA means the removal of restrictions on trade with other members and thus provides
productivity gains for the population, but entails heterogeneity costs;
² countries face interstate disputes over resources or production, and those are resolved either
peacefully or through war;
² war disrupts trade with the opponent.
As in Alesina and Spolaore (2003, p.116), "a country is de¯ned as an independent political unit in
which (1) defense is completely and credibly centralized, (2) a uni¯ed government takes decisions over
bargaining and war strategies, and (3) the net returns from con°ict are distributed across its citi-
zens"14. And a RTA is de¯ned as a complete integration of markets, each member bene¯ting from a
larger domestic market, i.e. an area free of barriers to trade. When entering a RTA, countries retain
an independent security policy, because defense capabilities remain national.
The model is a 3-stages game: (1) countries ¯rst decide whether or not to form RTAs, (2) then
they vote on their defense spending, and ¯nally (3) uncertainty about dispute location and escalation
probabilities are revealed and con°icts are resolved. This timing appears relevant because of the time
frame of each stage. Forming a RTA takes time and is meant to last a long time. Building defense
capabilities is also a medium term process, but is less time consuming. On the contrary, disputes
occur and are resolved in the short term and it seems logical that uncertainty about con°ict remains
when defense and regional integration decisions are made. The model have no time dimension. Under
this timing, countries thus choose whether to form RTAs or not and their level of defense spending for
given heterogeneity costs, level of international insecurity, and level of multilateral openness.
Each government chooses its level of defense spending and whether or not to enter a RTA in order
to maximize national utility, in an anarchic world where no supra-national institution can properly
14We thus abstract from non-unitary actor issues, and do not account for the impact of domestic politics or decision
mechanism (political system) on state behavior.
5enforce property rights. Countries thus interact in an insecure world, and both defense spending and
RTA formation are endogenous to the model. Based on con°ict theory15, countries face appropriation
possibilities on a part R of their income (R < Yi. For tractability reasons, the world is assumed to be
divided into four similar countries, two on the Eastern continent and two on the Western continent.
This world can be represented as in ¯gure 1, each country bordering two others. International disputes
occur with probability
½
4 between each pair of bordering countries, and are resolved through bargaining





Figure 1: A 4 countries / 2 continents world
As usual in the literature on political integration, entering a RTA entails heterogeneity costs
(k), "due to the necessity of keeping together individuals with di®erent interests, preferences, culture,
and history" (Alesina et al., 1995). Indeed, economic integration implies common policies and the
provision of some public goods at the regional level, which move away actual policies from individual
ideal/preferences in each country. For simplicity, it is assumed that the costs of forming a RTA between
Eastern and Western countries is prohibitive.16 Each country can therefore enter an agreement with
the bordering country on the same continent. And when forming a RTA, each member bears a cost
k. Regional integration takes place when both countries agree.
The utility function for each country i is:
Ui = Yi ¡ ©ik +
X
j6=i
Rij ¡ di 8i;j = 1;2;3;4 (1)
where Yi is the national income ©i is a dummy variable which equals 1 if country i forms a RTA,
di measures defense spending (0 < di < Yi), and Rij is the net return from con°ict.
1 Production, trade, and regional integration
Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Alesina et al. (2000) show that bigger countries bene¯t from a market
size advantage, which decreases with global trade openness. International trade faces additional costs
due to the lack of property rights protection at the interstate level. Because political and market
15See for instance Skaperdas (1992) for a complete model of production and appropriation.
16Heterogeneity costs could be considered more widely in relation with dyadic potential gains from trade creation.
This assumption is thus in accordance with the natural / unnatural RTA theory (Frankel et al., 1996), which relates
the desirability of RTA to the ratio of intercontinental to continental transport costs. In the same manner, multilateral
liberalization exhibits a prohibitive heterogeneity cost.
6boundaries overlap, a big country provides public goods such as contract enforcement by local courts
on a larger territory, and hence market, than small states. Citizens can thus bene¯t from a higher
productivity. Trade liberalization nevertheless loosens the relationship between political boundaries
and market size, because greater access to foreign markets renders the size of domestic market less
relevant. Following this line of argumentation, regional economic integration, to the extent that it
integrates national markets, would provide such big market advantage. Regionalism indeed partly
dissociates market and political boundaries. In the model, creating a RTA introduces free trade
among members and thus provides a big market advantage. National income is increasing with global
openness and with the number of trading partners in the world. In this simple model, trade is bene¯cial
to all countries and the ¯rst-best situation is one of complete multilateral openness.17 Country size is
normalized to 1. National income hence equals:
Yi = (1 ¡ µ)(1 + ©i) + µsW (2)
where 0 < µ < 1 is an exogenous indicator of multilateral openness (µ = 0 means autarky and
µ = 1 global free trade), and sW is the total number of trading partners of country i in the world,
including itself (it equals 4 in a peaceful world). National income is thus increasing with openness (µ)
and with the number of trading partners, and the trading relationship inside RTA is comparatively
more bene¯cial the more autarkic the world is. This de¯nition of income illustrate the fact that in a
fully globalized world, market size does not matter, but it does more the less free trade is.
In our 4 countries world, we have:
Yi =
(
2 + 2µ if country i belong to a RTA
1 + 3µ otherwise
(3)
National income is thus higher for members of a RTA than for independent countries. Those gains
are decreasing with multilateral openness to trade. They equal zero in free trade and are maximum
in autarky.
2 War and peace: the con°ict game
We adopt a rationalist explanation of war.18 That is to say that war occurs because some factors make
state leaders unable to ex ante reach a mutually advantageous arrangement on con°ict issues. Indeed,
as far as destructions are involved, the use of armed force to resolve disputes is a second best outcome
and is always Pareto dominated by a negotiated settlement. The question is then to understand what
precludes leaders to ¯nd and/or implement a bargaining solution. Fearon (1995) argues that only
three arguments ¯t a rationalist de¯nition of war: asymmetries of information on resolve or military
capabilities with incentives to misrepresent them, commitment problems, and issue indivisibility. The
17Ruta (2005) shows that this simpli¯ed setting highlights the same mechanisms than a more complex, and less
tractable, model of trade in intermediate goods as in Alesina et al. (2000).
18This view of war is widely developed by political scientists as well as economists. International Relations literature
highlights two alternative theories. One is to explain war occurrence by irrationality of state leaders, and the second
assumes that leaders may bene¯t from war without su®ering the cost whose load rests on soldiers or citizens.
7model of con°ict below, adapted from Alesina and Spolaore (2003, chapter 8), relies on the second
argument: wars occur because state leaders are unable to credibly commit to hold their position.
Consider two countries i and j evolving in an anarchic world, i.e. where no supranational institution
can enforce law.19 It is assumed that a part of their national income, R (0 < R < Yi), is potentially
subject to appropriation activities. It is worth noting that any con°ict issues a®ecting national utility
could be at stake, either on resource, rent sharing, ideology... A dispute may be settled peacefully
through bargaining or through war. If both countries bargain, the status quo holds and each retains
R, its share of the pooled income subject to appropriation.20 Otherwise, the distribution of payo®s
depends on the relative military strength of opponents and each country undergoes war costs. Players
face perfect information in the model. A traditional ratio contest success function de¯nes how the
valuable pie 2R is distributed in case of military ¯ght (Hirschleifer, 1988). When both countries choose












where di (dj) is country i's (j's) military spending.21
As far as war is costly, the war outcome is always Pareto dominated by the bargaining outcome. In
absence of any other speci¯cation, the dominant strategy is (bargain, bargain). But as Grossman
(2004) outlines, a peaceful negotiated settlement is credible only if none has incentives to deviate,
which is to say that each opponent is left better o® with the status quo than if he starts a war. In this
respect, if a military advantage of attacking exists, and if that advantage exceeds the cost of war, none
can credibly commit not to deviate. This ¯rst striker advantage, denoted E, could materialize through
a higher probability of winning or smaller war damages, etc. Its width is determined by factors such
as military technology or geography. It is assumed that E is the same for all countries and that the
country choosing to bargain when its opponent attacks undergoes a mirroring cost of equal magnitude.
Strategy sets and outcomes are summarized in table 1.
So in a situation where the ¯rst striker advantage is su±ciently large, i.e. if E > Cij, the Pareto-
optimal strategy, where both countries choose to bargain, is not a Nash-equilibrium. Given the oppo-
nent strategy, a country has incentives to deviate and strike ¯rst.22 In this case, it is straightforward to
19International relations theory introduces the anarchical nature of the international system in contrast with national
politics where the government is said to have the monopoly on legal coercion and armed force, and can thus enforce law
and impose peaceful dispute settlements.
20Without loss of generality and in order to avoid imposing constraints on the negotiation protocol, we consider that
countries retain preexisting rights on resources subject to appropriation, such that the status quo holds if countries
bargain. It is thus assumed that the status quo is inside a restricted interval of bargaining interval. This restriction just
assures that war arise because of commitment problems, and not issue indivisibility.
21 di
di+dj can be understood either as the probability of victory or as the proportion of the pie country i won in the
event of war, when states are risk neutral. The former interpretation is privileged here.
22The preexisting rights constraint is then: E¡Cij > R(1¡
2di
di+dj ) > ¡E¡Cij if di 6= dj. When di = dj, no constraint
has to be ful¯lled.
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show that the only Nash equilibrium is (¯ght,¯ght).23 Otherwise, both (bargain, bargain) and (¯ght,
¯ght) pro¯les are Nash equilibriums. But using re¯nements introduced by Bernheim et al. (1987) on
coalition of players, a unique coalition-proof Nash equilibrium emerges in each situation: depending
on E relative to Cij, a unique coalition-proof Nash-equilibrium exists; the strategy pro¯le outcome is
(bargain, bargain) if E < Cij, and (¯ght, ¯ght) if E > Cij. From this result, a probability of dispute
escalation to war can be derived. If the probability that E > Cij is noted ¼, a dispute ends up in war
with probability ¼ and is settled peacefully with probability 1 ¡ ¼.
A country has a probability
½
4 to experience a dispute with each of its two neighbors. Once a
dispute emerges, it is resolved according to our model of con°ict above. Expected net returns from
con°ict between two countries i and j depend on the probability of dispute ½ and the probability of








¡ Cij ¡ R
¸
(6)
3 Trade, con°ict and regional integration
In line with empirical evidence of a large and persistent e®ect of war on bilateral trade, provided by
Martin et al. (2005) and Glick and Taylor (2005), war is assumed to disrupt trade with opponent. The
cost underwent by countries entering a war is entirely related to bilateral trade disruption.24 War cost
thus equals income at peace less income at war: Cij = Y
peace
i ¡ Y war
i .
23If the attacking advantage is high enough, no country will choose to bargain, because it would be better o® with
open warfare than with a surprise attack.
24For simplicity, and without loss of generality, direct war costs and potential e®ects of war on multilateral trade,
which are found to be smaller but signi¯cant, are ignored.
9From equation 2, it follows:
Cij =
(
1 if countries i and j belong to the same RTA
µ otherwise
(7)
The opportunity cost of war is larger, the higher the gains from the bilateral trading relationship.
Together with the con°ict game, this result has two corollaries. First, con°ict escalation to war is
less likely among countries trading intensively with each other. ¼ is thus a decreasing function of µ:
¼
0
µ < 0 and 0 < ¼ < 1. Second, the probability of con°ict escalation to war is smaller among countries
pertaining to the same RTA, because they trade more with each other, which raises the opportunity
cost from war and deters con°ict escalation. We have: 0 < ¼RTA < ¼ < 1.
The form of the ¼ function and the di®erence between ¼ and ¼RTA is a function of E, the attacking
advantage, which in turn depend on military technology and geography (supposed ¯xed in the short
term), and the level of multilateral trade openness µ. Notwithstanding, no particular form is imposed
to ¼ function, which is likely to depend on how speci¯c RTAs a®ect the geography of trade and on
institutional design of each arrangement.25
Equilibrium defense spending can now be derived. They maximize each country's expected net
return from con°ict. Equilibrium defense spending depends on RTA membership as follows:
di =
( R½¼




Proof in appendix A.
Defense spending are thus reduced in a world with RTAs. It is worth noting that defense spending
are pure waste in this model with appropriation possibilities. All countries would be better o® if none
diverts resources in defense capabilities building.
This result is in accordance with empirical evidence on the signi¯cance of neighborhood in explaining
the level of military spending. Collier and Hoe²er (2005) indeed ¯nd that the huge di®erence in mil-
itary spending across countries, which range from close to zero to 45% of GDP, is strongly in°uenced
by neighbors, because of arms race behavior. They estimate that the decision by one country to raise
its military spending can result in a three times more important increase for each country in the region.
From equation 6, 7 and 8, the net expected gain from con°ict can be computed. It equals, for














25This question of the respective impact of political Vs trade integration on war occurrence is largely an empirical
matter, on which we do not want to impose any theoretical a priori. This question will be handled in the ¯rst part of
the empirical section.
10And the "con°ict related" gains from regional integration are:
RRTA






The right hand side balances expected war costs in each con¯guration of the world. Its sign depends on
the tradeo® between expected costs from con°ict inside and outside the RTA. In fact if the inhibiting
e®ect of regional integration on con°ict escalation exceeds the higher opportunity cost of war, "con°ict




µ , security gains from integration are increasing in µ. In this case, globalization
has two opposite e®ects with respect to regional integration: the large market advantage decreases
with trade liberalization whereas the associated security gains increase.
4 Equilibria
Conditions under which regional integration will take place can now be derived from equation 1, 3, 8




¼(2µ + R) ¡ ¼RTA(2 + R)
¤
+ 1 ¡ µ > k (11)
Proof in appendix A.
This inequation balances expected bene¯ts from regional integration to its cost, for given hetero-
geneity costs, level of multilateral openness, and level of international security. Incentives to integrate
depends positively on the amount of income subject to con°ict, and negatively on global trade open-
ness and heterogeneity cost of integration. Furthermore, international insecurity (½) has an ambiguous
e®ect on incentives to integrate. From equation 11, the following testable proposition can be derived.
Testable proposition: International insecurity favors the creation of RTAs providing a signi¯-
cant security externality, whereas it deters the formation of other RTAs.
This result will be explored empirically in the next section. In fact, incentives to form a RTA depend
on the di®erence between ¼ and ¼RTA, i.e. on the way regional integration translates into inhibiting
mechanism. If the pacifying e®ect of regional integration more than compensates the larger war costs
(i.e. the di®erence between ¼ and ¼RTA is su±ciently large), then the occurrence of international
disputes favors the creation of RTAs. The opposite is true if the pacifying e®ect of regional integration
is not su±ciently large. In our model, the form of the ¼ function determines this di®erence. Provided
that political institutions designed to foster trade a®ect war occurrence, it seems straightforward to
suppose that the form of this function depends on institutions created along the integration process as
well as how it a®ects the geography of trade. Indeed, the integration of markets needs supranational
political institutions to be sustainable and involves the provision of public goods in common. The more
integrated the RTA is, the more political institutions are needed to implement the agreement. And
this degree of political integration needed for a given level of economic integration to be sustainable
shapes the way intra-regional con°icts are managed, that is the peaceful impact of integration.
11It is worth noting that the probability that an international war actually occurs is endogenous to





Á¼RTA + (2 ¡ Á)¼
¤
(12)
Any factor a®ecting decisions on regional integration will thus indirectly a®ect the probability of ob-
serving a war. A reduction of international insecurity (½ decreases), could, for instance, by reducing





result in a higher probability to observe an actual war, ­½
0 > ­½.
5 Extension: size asymmetry
So, the analysis has been restricted to the symmetric case. This section extends the model to the case
of a world with asymmetric countries, where one western country is assumed to be larger. Its size
equals sk = 1 + 3¾, whereas other country size equals sh = 1 ¡ ¾. As previously, world size remains
equal to four. Hence, income is de¯ned by:




> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
1 ¡ ¾ + (3 + ¾)µ if there is no RTA and i 6= k
1 ¡ ¾ + (3 + ¾)µ if there is no RTA and i=k
2 ¡ 2¾ + (2 + 2¾)µ if country i belongs to a RTA with j and j 6= k
2 + 2¾ + (2 ¡ 2¾)µ if country i belongs to a RTA with j and j=k
2 + 2¾ + (2 ¡ 2¾)µ if country i=k belongs to a RTA
(14)
War costs are thus as follows:
Cij =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
(1 ¡ ¾)µ if there is no RTA and j 6= k
(1 + 3¾)µ if there is no RTA and j = k
1 ¡ ¾ if i and j belong to the same RTA and j 6= k
1 + 3¾ if i and j belong to the same RTA and j = k
(15)
War probabilities depend on the least constrained state, i.e. the country in the dyad whose war
cost is smaller. It is the large country in dyads to which it belongs. As previously, we thus have
¼ > ¼RTA on each continent.
Hence, as above, equilibrium defense spending equals in all countries:
di =
( R½¼




Proof in appendix A.
12Interestingly, the result of Alesina and Spolaore (Forthcoming), that large countries bene¯t from a
scale advantage in con°ict, holds in this model. Indeed, defense spending in percentage of income are
smaller in the large country than in the small countries.
So for given heterogeneity costs, level of multilateral openness, and level of international security,




¼RTA(2 ¡ 2¾ + R) ¡ ¼(2µ ¡ 2¾µ + R)
¤
+ (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ¾) > k (17)
Proof in appendix A.
Incentives to integrate are thus decreasing the more unequal the world size distribution is. That is
to say that regional integration is more likely the larger the economic size of partner countries with
respect to the rest of the world, and the less unequal the economic size inside RTA is. In addition, it
is worth noting that this deterrent size e®ect decreases with multilateral openness.
13III Econometrics
In this section, the ¯nal result of the theoretical model is empirically tested, and especially the testable
proposition derived from equation 11. It suggests that determinants of regional integration di®er ac-
cording to the kind of RTA created. More integrated RTAs, i.e. those providing signi¯cant security
externalities, are more likely among countries experiencing lots of interstate disputes, whereas the
opposite is true for other RTAs. However, it is ¯rst necessary to assess formally which kinds of RTAs
provide security externality.
1 The e®ect of regionalism on war
The preliminary step of this empirical analysis is to investigate the pacifying e®ect of di®erent kind
of RTAs on interstates relations. As explicitly modeled in the theoretical model, war results from a
two-stage process, namely con°ict initiation and con°ict escalation to war. A war cannot occur unless
a dispute arises beforehand. Using a simple probit model to estimate the conditional probability of
war (¼ in the theoretical model) could thus yield results subject to a selection bias. The probability of
existence of a dispute (½) between two given countries should be taken into account. Once a con°ict
emerges, it is likely that the process driving its evolution greatly di®ers from the one explaining its
initiation. Di®erent factors could therefore have di®erent impacts depending on the stage of the con°ict
process. For instance, neighboring countries are likely to face more disputes and also to be more prone
to escalate them to war, because sharing a common border makes the use of armed force easier. Using
a wide de¯nition of con°icts, including diplomatic and economic disputes, Kinsella and Russett (2002)
show that determinants of con°ict onset and escalation di®er and that the e®ect of some of them are
nonmonotonic on the whole range of the con°ict process. They ¯nd power parity and major power
status to foster only dispute initiation, whereas alliances foster it but deter con°ict escalation.
Moreover selection e®ects have to be modeled because the escalation process is observed only if a
dispute occurred. Unobserved variables, such as commitment, resolve or willingness to take risk, could
therefore a®ect di®erently escalation and initiation process, or could be disclosed at di®erent stage of
the con°ict process. As Fearon (1995) emphasizes, asymmetries of information are particularly relevant
for explaining war occurrence. States enters disputes with few information on opponent's commitment
or resolve. But this information is disclosed along the con°ict process and could therefore in°uence
later stages. Boehmer et al. (2001) argue that states use low level con°icts to signal their resolve
in a dispute. This way, they substitute diplomatic or economic hostility for military con°icts. The
degree of asymmetric information therefore di®ers according to the stage of the con°ict process. And
information disclosed when a dispute is initiated is likely to in°uence its escalation process.26
Escalation process is estimated for each dyad-year using a censored probit accounting for selection.27
It allows to jointly model con°ict initiation and escalation and to account for the impact of each factor
on di®erent stages of the con°ict process. Two equations are thus jointly estimated, one explaining
26Econometrically speaking, error terms of con°ict initiation and escalation equations could be correlated, which creates
room for selection bias. The selection e®ect could be positive or negative, depending on how unobserved factors, like
commitment or resolve, a®ect both the likelihood of dispute initiation and the settlement of con°ict.
27The likelihood function is derived from a bivariate probit and accounts for selection. See Reed (2000) for a discussion
of alternative econometric models.
14the dispute initiation and the second the con°ict escalation to war. Consider y1 and y2, two latent
(unobserved ) variables, representing the di®erence in utility levels from dispute initiation and dispute
escalation to war respectively. The model estimated is derived from a standard bivariate probit model:
y1 = ¯1X1 + ²1 and dispute =
(
1 if y1 > 0
0 if y1 · 0
y2 = ¯2X2 + ²2 and war =
(
1 if y2 > 0
0 if y2 · 0
(18)
where X1;2 are vectors of explanatory variables, ¯1;2 vectors of parameters, and errors terms ²1 and ²2
are assumed to be independent from X1;2 and to follow E(²1) = E(²2) = 0; V ar(²1) = V ar(²2) = 1,
and Cov[²1; ²2] = %. The action to escalate a dispute to war can however not be observed unless a
dispute occurs. Hence, the log-likelihood function is based on unconditional probabilities associated
with the three possible outcomes (Greene, 2003, p.713): no dispute (dispute = 0), a dispute emerges
but does not escalate to war (dispute = 1 and war = 0), and the dispute escalates into war (dispute = 1
and war = 1).
1.1 Data
What we are interested in in this paper is the degree of political integration implied by each type of
trading agreement. Therefore we do not consider their relative ability to foster trade among members
countries but the actual negotiation and implementation of trading arrangements. RTA whose dispo-
sitions have never been really implemented are thus excluded. The data set collects all regional (i.e.
three or more parties) trade arrangements which take the form of Preferential Trading Arrangement
(PA), Free Trade Area (FTA), Customs Union (CU), Common market (CM), or Political Agreement
(PoA)28, in force at least a certain period of time between 1948 and 2001. Bilateral arrangements as
well as non reciprocal arrangements are thus excluded from our study.29 This restriction is imposed
for at least two reasons: the institutional framework of bilateral trading arrangements is limited and
likely to di®er from regional arrangements, and it is di±cult to compute all bilateral arrangements
and especially their depth on a long time span as ours.30 The de¯nition of RTAs adopted here is thus
close to what Ethier (1998) calls geographical regionalism. Information on trading agreements have
been assembled from noti¯cations to the WTO31, Foroutan (1993, 1998), Langhammer and Hiemenz
(1990), Frankel (1997), Machlup (1977) and other public sources. Unless otherwise mentioned in our
sources, an agreement is assumed to be "in force" at the date de¯ned in the treaty and, if not avail-
able, once the agreement has been signed and rati¯ed. It should, however, be noted that this does
28Based on WTO, a PA is de¯ned as agreements among three or more parties in which reciprocal preferences are
exchanged to cover a limited range of the parties' trade in goods (partial in scope); a FTA is de¯ned as agreements
among three or more parties in which reciprocal preferences are exchanged to cover a large spectrum of the parties' trade
in goods; a CU is de¯ned as a RTA with a common external tari® in addition to the exchange of trade preferences; a
CM is de¯ned as a RTA allowing free movements of factors (goods, capital and workers); and a PoA is de¯ned as an
organizations aiming at liberalizing trade among its members but falling short of providing for tari® preferences inherent
in a CU, FTA or PA.
29Exceptions are the inclusion of CU between EU and Malta, Cyprus and Turkey, and CU between Slovakia and Czech
Republic, and the Closer Economic Relations agreement between Australia and New-Zealand.
30Moreover, contrary to RTAs, bilateral arrangements are signed between distant countries, less likely to experience
any interstates con°icts, and are thus less relevant in our purpose. We shall return to this in the ¯nal section.
31http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm
15not necessarily mean that all provisions of the agreement have been fully implemented. Four dummy
variables are de¯ned and coded 1 if both country in the dyad are members of the same RTA during the
year considered: PoA, PA, FTA and deep RTA, which aggregates CM and CU. Deep RTAs are those
involving a more complete political integration and the provision of some public goods in common.
Our data set reports 55 RTA over the period 1948-2001, of which 8 are coded as PoA, 17 PA, 12 FTA,
16 CU and 3 CM (see Appendix B1 for a detailed list).
The main dependent variable is the occurrence of a Military Interstate Disputes (MID) between two
states in a given year. This variable is coded from the COW database (Bremer et al., 1996) and
accounts for all interstates disputes on the 1948-2001 period involving the display or the use of armed
force, i.e. a MID of hostility level 3 (display of force), 4 (use of force) or 5 (war) in the COW32.
Qualitative data provided by armed con°icts data sets, such as MID used as our explained variable,
implies that actors, duration, geographical location and intensity of each con°ict have been de¯ned
by researchers. Thus, only rare events such as war can be considered. But to assess dispute initiation
process, we need to measure con°icts of lower intensity, not reported in such data sets. An alternative
type of database is available: event data which account for a broader range of interstates relations.
Event data are reported, by trained students or automatically by computers, on a day by day basis
from newspapers or wire services and coded by actor, target, as well as action form and date. In
comparison to armed con°ict data sets, it is quasi impossible to know whether di®erent events pertain
to the same united historical case. If assessing the evolution of a given con°ict is hardly feasible, such
data enable to measure the occurrence of a dispute a given year, which is what we are interested in in
the present analysis. Knowing if a con°ict lasts and how it evolves is indeed not the question addressed
here. Our aim is to assess, when a dispute occurs, whether it is settled peacefully or ends up in war.
In addition, data on daily events have the great advantage of providing information whatever the
intensity of the underlying event. It is thus feasible to measure con°icts at di®erent level of intensity.
Events data compiled by Kinsella and Russett (2002) and available on their website33 are used to
measure the occurrence of a dispute exceeding a certain threshold de¯ned as strong verbal hostility.34
They overlap data from three event databases, the Con°ict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), the
World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) and the Protocol for the Assessment of Nonviolent Direct
Action (PANDA), to construct a dummy variable coded 1 if a dispute occurs for any dyad-year over
the 1950-1992 period.35 Table 2 provides event categories coded as disputes and their equivalent on the
widely used Goldstein (1992) scale, which rates events between -10 and +10 according to the level of
con°ict or cooperation they embed. Only events classi¯ed at least as con°ictual as categories "Cancel
or postpone planned events" and "Charge; criticize; blame; disapprove" are coded as a dispute. Out
32War is restrictively de¯ned as a MID involving at least 1000 deaths of military personnel. Most studies of war
use a wider de¯nition of military con°icts as we do, which do not include the MID level 2 (threat to use force). More
information is available from COW website: http://cow2.la.psu.edu/.
33http://www.yale.edu/unsy/democ/democ1.htm
34See Kinsella and Russett (2002, p.1054-1055) for more details on databases used and the operationalizing of the
minimum con°ict intensity threshold. Schrodt and Gerner (2000) present the limitations related to the use of events
data. Thanks to the use of events exceeding a certain intensity in our analysis, much of the biases they identify are
limited.
35196 cases exhibit a MID but no dispute. We follow Kinsella and Russett (2002) and treat them as measurement
errors, due to the fact that events data sets rely on major news media and do not cover accordingly all regions of the
world. The dummy variable is thus recoded as if a dispute occurred.
16of the 201 627 dyad-years for which such event data are available in our basic speci¯cation, 12 047
experience a dispute, of which 1007 escalate into MID.
Table 2: Events and Goldstein scale
Event category Goldstein
Request action; call for -0,1
Explicit decline to comment -0,1
Urge or suggest action or policy -0,1
Comment on situation -0,2
Deny an accusation -0,9
Deny an attributed policy, action, role or position -1,1
Grant asylum -1,1
Make complaint (not formal) -1,9
Cancel or postpone planned events -2,2
Charge; criticize; blame; disapprove -2,2
Issue formal complaint or protest -2,4
Give warning -3
Denounce; denigrate; abuse -3,4
Halt negotiation -3,8
Turn down proposal; reject protest, demand, threat -4
Refuse; oppose; refuse to allow -4
Reduce routine international activity; recall o±cials -4,1
Detain or arrest person(s) -4,4
Threat without speci¯c negative sanction stated -4,4
Issue order or command, insist, demand compliance -4,9
Expel organization or group -4,9
Order person or personnel out of country -5
Nonmilitary demonstration, walk out on -5,2
Reduce or cut o® aid or assistance; act to punish/deprive -5,6
Threat with speci¯c negative nonmilitary sanction -5,8
Ultimatum; threat with negative sanction and time limit -6,9
Threat with force speci¯ed -7
Break diplomatic relations -7
Armed force mobilization, exercise, display; military buildup -7,6
Noninjury destructive action -8,3
Nonmilitary destruction/injury -8,7
Seize position or possessions -9,2
Military attack; clash; assault -10
Source: Goldstein (1992)
Trade data are from the database assembled by Katherine Barbieri36, who uses mostly informa-
tion from the IMF and the League of Nations international trade statistics. Her data spans over the
1870-1992 period. It is completed by Martin et al. (2005) up to 2001 using the IMF DOTS database.
Income data also comes from Martin et al. (2005), and are assembled from Katherine Barbieri and
the World Bank WDI database.
Others control variables are described below. Geographic data are from CEPII37, and military data
are from the COW project. The composite democracy indicator is taken from Polity IV38. It measures
openness/closedness of political institutions on a -10 / +10 scale (10 means high democracy). Finally,
UN vote correlation is taken from "The A±nity of Nations: Similarity of State Voting Positions in






Results are presented in table 3. Estimates of the selection e®ect are found to be negative. Their
signi¯cance nevertheless decreases with the number of control included, and it turns insigni¯cant in
speci¯cation (4) and (5). The selection e®ect of unobserved variables vanishes when enough dyadic
speci¯c control are added, and particularly proxy for cultural and political proximity such as vote cor-
relation at the UN general assembly and dummy for country pairs ever in a colonial relationship and
for countries sharing a common colonizer. The issue of nonmonotony of the impact of determinants of
war appears more relevant, since several determinants have opposed e®ects on con°ict initiation and
escalation.
Speci¯cation (1) displays the basic model. It includes the 4 variables of RTA membership and two
basic determinants of war: the number of peaceful years between the two countries in the dyad to
account for time dependency, which is common in this literature, and the log of the distance between
the main cities of the two countries, as a proxy of the opportunity of armed con°icts. More integrated
RTAs are however also those likely to increase the more intra-regional trade. In order to disentangle
pacifying e®ect of regionalism going through the trade channel or through the political integration
channel, trade interdependence should be controlled for. The choice of trade variables follows Martin
et al. (2005), which is the more theoretically grounded and comprehensive paper on the relationship
between trade and war. Their argument is that bilateral trade deters con°ict escalation to war whereas
multilateral trade openness fosters war occurrence. Hence, both a proxy for bilateral trade interdepen-
dence (the log of the mean of bilateral trade °ows in percentage of GDP), and another for multilateral
trade dependence (the log of the mean of multilateral (excluding bilateral) imports in percentage of
GDP) are included, as well as a dummy for dyad experiencing zero trade °ows (both exports and im-
ports).40 Martin et al. (2005) also add interaction variables between distance and their two variables
of interest, which are deemed to account for the dyadic di®erence in dispute occurrence, that they do
not explicitly measure. The methodology adopted here does, so these interaction terms are ignored in
the estimation of the escalation process. In order to remove the potential contemporaneous e®ect of
war on bilateral and multilateral trade, trade variables are lagged 5 years. Martin et al. (2005) indeed
show that a 5-years lag is enough to remove any contemporaneous reverse e®ect of war on trade.41
As expected, among our variables of interest, only deep RTA membership exhibits a signi¯cant and
negative coe±cient at the escalation stage of the con°ict process. FTA membership do reduce dispute
initiation, whereas PoA membership increases the number of dispute. Concerning trade, results pre-
sented here tend to con¯rm its ambiguous e®ect on war, but the mechanism appears slightly di®erent.
Bilateral trade does reduce escalation to war probabilities, as well as the number of dispute, but multi-
lateral openness fosters dispute initiation. By raising domestic economy dependency on external trade,
openness would render country more sensitive to foreign decisions and increases dispute occurrence.
40These are not missing values but country pairs for which no trade is reported. Martin et al. (2005) interpret this
variable as a control for trade ¯xed costs.
41RTA membership is obviously not a®ected by any contemporaneous e®ect of military con°ict, because it takes time to
negotiate and implement an agreement. Using panel ¯xed e®ect or instrumental variable econometric models to control
for endogeneity potentially arising from omitted variables likely to a®ect simultaneously war and RTA membership, as
Martin et al. (2005) do concerning war and trade, is not possible here because too few dyads enter both war and RTA
over our time period and exogenous determinants of RTA membership are not available.
18Other control variables have the expected sign: the number of peaceful years in the dyad reduces the
probability of war escalation as well as the number of disputes, and distance reduces the probability
of escalation to war. Surprisingly, more distant countries seem to experience more disputes, which
we attribute to a problem of multicollinearity due to the inclusion of interaction variables.42 This
con¯rms our theoretical ¯nding that the deeper RTAs, i.e. those implying political integration, are
those exerting a pacifying e®ect, out of any trade e®ect.
Speci¯cation (2) includes a control variable for countries sharing a common border, which is likely
to a®ect war occurrence, trade relations and RTA membership. As expected, contiguity increases
both the number of disputes and the probability of escalation to war. Results remain similar, except
that the coe±cient on distance becomes insigni¯cant. In speci¯cation (3), a proxy for the democratic
status of states in the dyad is added. More democratic countries are indeed likely to be at the same
time less prone to escalate con°icts into war, and more prone to form a RTA. Its omission could
biased the coe±cient on RTA membership upward. Then, in speci¯cation (4) controls for cultural,
historical and diplomatic a±nities between countries are included. These are the UN general assembly
vote correlation, a dummy for pairs ever in a colonial relationship and another for countries sharing a
common colonizer. Countries sharing a±nities are more likely to be part of the same RTA, to trade
more and to be less warlike, whereas countries sharing common colonial history would exhibit more
unresolved con°ict issues. As expected, more democratic countries are less likely to escalate a dispute
into war, but they experience more disputes. Sharing political a±nities signi¯cantly reduce disputes
between states, but has no e®ect on escalation to war probabilities. On the other hand, countries
sharing colonial linkage face signi¯cantly more disputes. Finally, controls for country size , - a bigger
territory is more di±cult to defend and is exposed to more opponents, but a big country is also less
open to trade and is particular with respect to regional integration, as it often implies asymmetric
integration -, and countries sharing a common defense alliance are included in speci¯cation (5). Big
countries in fact initiate signi¯cantly more disputes, but no e®ect is recorded on the escalation stage.
Sharing an alliance appears to have an ambiguous e®ect on war occurrence, as it reduces escalation
probabilities but fosters dispute initiation.
Concerning RTA membership variables, only deep RTA membership has a signi¯cant e®ect on con°ict
escalation along all alternative estimations. Its coe±cient on probabilities of escalation to war is, as
expected, negative and signi¯cant, at the 5% level in the more complete speci¯cation (5). Deep RTAs
thus reduce probabilities of war, by preventing disputes to escalate into war. This e®ect is however
slightly counterbalanced by the fact that countries pertaining to such agreements initiate signi¯cantly
more disputes. This result is in line with the argument that countries use con°icts as an instrument in
international relations, and substitute lower level con°icts to armed con°icts (Boehmer et al., 2001).
On the contrary, FTA and PA membership are found to have no signi¯cant e®ect on war. Finally,
PoA yield a positive and signi¯cant coe±cient concerning dispute initiation. An explanation would
be that countries facing lots of disputes, propensity that we do not control for, select into forming
a PoA. The results of this section clearly con¯rm the hypothesis that only the political integration
involved by deep RTAs provides security externalities. These kind of agreements (CU and CM) are
42Without these interaction terms, distance is found to signi¯cantly reduce dispute occurrence, and its e®ect on esca-
lation probabilities remains negative but insigni¯cant. Their omission renders coe±cients on trade variables particularly
sensitive to alternative speci¯cations. Results on RTA membership remain globally qualitatively similar.
19Table 3: Impact of RTAs on war: Censored Probit model
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: MID Dispute MID Dispute MID Dispute MID Dispute MID Dispute











(0.28) (0.09) (0.28) (0.08) (0.26) (0.09) (0.27) (0.10) (0.26) (0.08)
FTA membership 0.22 -0.31
b 0.21 -0.33
b 0.36 -0.43
a 0.21 -0.10 0.27 -0.09
(0.26) (0.13) (0.28) (0.13) (0.30) (0.15) (0.30) (0.15) (0.29) (0.14)
PA membership -0.00 0.02 -0.11 -0.05 -0.08 0.02 -0.11 0.24
a 0.00 0.03
(0.12) (0.06) (0.11) (0.05) (0.12) (0.05) (0.13) (0.05) (0.13) (0.06)






(0.21) (0.11) (0.21) (0.12) (0.21) (0.11) (0.24) (0.13) (0.27) (0.12)



















(0.06) (0.51) (0.05) (0.51) (0.06) (0.52) (0.07) (0.44) (0.11) (0.48)









(ln mean bil. imports / GDP) (0.45) (1.84) (0.43) (1.82) (0.42) (1.89) (0.43) (1.54) (0.41) (1.75)






(ln avg multi. import/ GDP) (0.17) (0.45) (0.15) (0.44) (0.15) (0.44) (0.14) (0.44) (0.11) (0.41)



















(0.12) (0.07) (0.12) (0.07) (0.16) (0.07) (0.15) (0.07)







(0.07) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03)
UN vote correlation 0.20 -0.95
a 0.28 -1.10
a
(0.20) (0.05) (0.31) (0.05)
Colonial relationship -0.17 0.35
a -0.23 0.54
a
(0.13) (0.10) (0.18) (0.08)
Common colonizer 0.01 0.10
b -0.06 0.15
a
(0.11) (0.05) (0.12) (0.05)
sum ln areas -0.01 0.13
a
(0.04) (0.01)










(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.20) (0.22)






(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 150924 150924 143894 131273 128535
Uncensored Obs. 10137 10137 9210 8025 7904
Log likelihood -32435.7 -32250.1 -29315.6 -24475.9 -23001.0




Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for intragroup correlation in parentheses. a, b and c respectively
denote signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Intercept and time dummies not reported.
20thus likely to be those found in our model to be signed by countries experiencing lots of disputes. The
next section explicitly test it.
2 RTA formation
This section investigates the ¯nal result of the theoretical model, i.e. the determinants of di®erent
kind of regional integration. The econometric model, directly derived from equation 11, estimates for
each kind of RTA the probability of its formation between two countries i and j at time t using a
probit model:
Pr(RTAijt = 1) = ¯0 + ¯1 Disputeijt + ¯2 Controlsijt + ¯4Tt + ²ijt (19)
Equation 11 states that integration is positively correlated to dispute occurrence ½ if and only if
the reduction of war probabilities more than compensate the higher opportunity cost of war among
RTA members. If not, increasing international insecurity will lower integration incentives (¯1 > 0 for
deep RTAs and ¯1 < 0 for shallow RTAs). Factors a®ecting incentives to form a RTA in the theoretical
model are included as control variables: multilateral trade openness, heterogeneity costs of integration,
i.e. geographical as well as cultural proximity of countries in the dyad, and, from equation 20, and
economic size of the partner country.
The probability of RTA between two countries is estimated every ¯ve years between 1980 and 2000.
Proximity is approximated by the distance between the most populated cities of the two countries and
common border for its geographic part, and income level similarity (the log of the di®erence of income
per capita) and dummies for common language and common colonizer for its cultural and historical
part. Two proxy for economic size are included: the average GDP of countries in the dyad and the
absolute di®erence in GDP.
As Baier and Bergstrand (2004) underline, endogeneity should be considered in our modeling
strategy, because past RTA membership could impact current economic fundamentals of members. To
deal with this endogeneity issue, three strategies are implemented.
² First, the variables of similarity of income per capita and GDP level and di®erence are lagged.
Their 1960 value is used, which is a trade-o® between data availability and length of the lag.
This reduces our sample of countries, because several countries were not independent in 1960.
² Concerning our variable of primary interest, dyadic dispute occurrence, a di®erent strategy is
implemented, in order to consider its evolution over time. An IV probit model is estimated, where
dispute occurrence is determined endogenously, thanks to the use of exogenous instrumental
variables.43 Theory in international relations gives us exogenous instrumental variables: the
ratio of military capabilities (i.e. the ratio of lower to higher capacity index) and the major power
status of countries in the dyad are highly correlated to dispute occurrence but not directly related
to RTA membership. This former indicator is compiled by the COW project from six indicators:
43Another advantage of IV econometric models is that they also deal with measurement error of the endogenous
explanatory variable, which is, as explained above, also valuable in our case.
21military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban
population, and total population. It is commonly used in political science to assess the relative
national military capabilities.44
² Multilateral trade openness is also likely to be a®ected by past RTA membership. However, no
appropriate instrumental variables are available, because standard geographical determinants of
trade openness also a®ect RTA formation. A di®erent procedure is implemented here to deal
with this potential endogeneity bias: natural openness of countries in the dyad is controlled for
by including the average of multilateral trade/GDP, lagged in 1960 to remote any e®ect of past
RTA membership on current openness; and a proxy for world trade openness is added, - the
average tari®s level for a sample of 28 countries45 -, which is exogenous to the dyad. The use
of two di®erent variables to account for countries natural propensity to trade on the one hand
and the globalization trend, independently of the dyadic situation, on the other hand resolves
the question of endogeneity linked to former arrangements.
Events data described in the previous section are used to construct a proxy for dispute propensity.
The interstate dispute variable is de¯ned as the dyadic dispute propensity over a 10 years period,
lagged nine years to both prevent any simultaneity bias and take into account the time needed to
negotiate an agreement.46 Because the traditional Sargan test is not applicable in our econometric
speci¯cation, a Smith-Blundell test (with the probexog program) and a Wald test of exogeneity are
implemented to test for the exogeneity of our model and the relevance of our two stage probit IV
econometric speci¯cation. Both strongly con¯rm the need to account for endogeneity (¯rst stage es-
timates are provided in Appendix C).
Econometric results from the preceding section showed that only the more integrated RTAs, such as
common markets or custom unions, clearly provide security externalities. These kinds of RTAs are
thus those likely to reduce war probabilities so as to more than compensate the higher potential loss
from war among members. On the other side, free trade and preferential agreements do not entail
enough political integration to exert any independent pacifying e®ect. They should be deterred by
international insecurity. Hence, determinants of RTA formation between two countries are evaluated
separately for the di®erent kinds of agreements. Two categories are de¯ned: deep RTAs which include
custom union and common markets, and shallow RTAs, which gather together preferential and free
trade agreements.
44More information is available from COW website: http://cow2.la.psu.edu/
45Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong,
Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, and United States. Data are assembled by Gwartney and Lawson (2005) from
World Bank (Various issues) and other sources (see http://www.freetheworld.com for details).
46Finally, the data set includes 87 countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Czech
Republic (Czechoslovakia in 1960), Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany (German Federal Republic in 1960), Greece, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Liberia, Madagascar,
Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway,
Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia,
South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.
222.1 Results
Results are reported in table 4.47 First, simple probit estimation results for pooled RTAs are presented
in column (1). Propensity to dispute is found to have a signi¯cant negative e®ect on RTA formation.
Initial trade openness exhibit no signi¯cant coe±cient whereas the average global tari®s level is found
to be inversely related to RTA formation. That means that the freer trade is, the more incentives to
integrate countries have. The probability of RTA signi¯cantly rises with the average GDP size of the
two countries and if they are contiguous. On the contrary, a larger GDP and per capita GDP di®er-
ential exerts a negative impact on RTA formation, as well as distance. Separating deep and shallow
RTAs gives a slightly di®erent picture (model (2)). Propensity to dispute is found to deter shallow
RTAs, but has no signi¯cant impact on deep RTAs. These results are however potentially subject to
an endogeneity bias, because it has been found that RTA membership a®ects the con°ict process.
Speci¯cation (3) presents estimation results when dispute propensity is instrumented in order to
account for any endogeneity biases. Dispute propensity is found to be signi¯cantly and strongly neg-
atively associated to shallow RTAs and positively to deep RTAs, in accordance with our theoretical
model. In addition, the average multilateral tari®s level is found to be negatively related to both
deep and shallow RTA formation. This means that a more open international trade system fosters
all kinds of regionalism. However, the initial level of trade openness has a di®erent e®ect according
to the kind of RTAs created. Natural openness to trade favors the creation of deep RTAs, but deters
shallow RTAs. On the whole, countries more integrated to the world trading system are induced to
create RTAs involving a large regional institutional framework. And this is all the more true the
more globalized the world is. This is in line with North (1990, p.34), which states that "the greater
the specialization and the number and variability of valuable attributes, the more weight must be put
on reliable institutions that allow individuals to engage in complex contracting with a minimum of
uncertainty about whether the terms of the contract can be realized". A broader supranational institu-
tional framework would therefore allow country members to rely more heavily (be more dependent)
on external trade. And this is more relevant the more integrated the whole world is, because further
integration in a regional agreement would be deeper and thus necessitate more political institutions in
a more globalized world. On the other hand, remote countries, which are less integrated to the world
trading system, tend to form shallow RTAs.
Concerning other control variables, they globally exhibit the expected sign. Any form of regional-
ism is deterred by heterogeneity among countries. More distant countries, as well as countries whose
income level is dissimilar, are signi¯cantly less likely to form any RTA, whereas adjacency increases
only incentives to create shallow RTAs. Hence, geographic proximity is captured by distance for deep
RTA, and by the common border dummy for shallow RTA. Sharing a common colonizer has no signif-
icant e®ect on incentives to integrate. Sharing a common o±cial primary language favors the creation
of shallow RTAs, but it is surprisingly negatively related to the probability to form a deep RTA.
Concerning the size distribution of partner countries, as expected incentives to integrate increase with
the economic size of member states, and, for shallow regionalism, the less unequal the size distribution.
47Time dummies and intercept are included but not reported.
23Table 4: Probabilities of RTA between two countries
Probit IV Probit IV Probit
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: all Shallow Deep Shallow Deep Shallow Deep
RTAs RTAs RTAs RTAs RTAs RTAs RTAs







(0.17) (0.21) (0.27) (0.35) (0.90) (0.35) (0.87)





























(0.15) (0.16) (0.24) (0.19) (0.25) (0.20) (0.25)








(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06)







(0.09) (0.09) (0.23) (0.08) (0.23) (0.08) (0.20)
Common colonizer -0.18 -0.19 0.62
b 0.05 0.48 0.29
b 1.58
a
(0.15) (0.16) (0.31) (0.14) (0.31) (0.14) (0.35)







(0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.12) (0.03) (0.13)





(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06)








Observations 12445 12445 12445 12445 12445 11698 11698
Log pseudolikelihood -3856.5 -3434.3 -604.4 2996.4 5726.1 3182.7 5760.9










Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for intragroup correlation in parentheses. a, b and c
respectively denote signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Time dummies and
intercept are not reported.
Two important control variables, not directly derived from the model, are added in the last speci-
¯cation of table 4, because they are likely to a®ect both RTA formation and dispute occurrence: the
level of democracy and a dummy variable for countries sharing a common defense alliance. Some
empirical evidences show that more democratic countries are more likely to form RTAs (Mans¯eld et
al., 2002). On the other side, democratic status is also likely to a®ect dispute occurrence. Its omis-
sion could thus bias the results. In addition, it is likely that citizens from democratic countries share
common preferences, which reduces heterogeneity costs of political integration. Similarly, sharing a
common defence alliance could a®ect both the RTA membership and the way con°icts are settled.
Results strongly con¯rm that sharing a defence alliance foster the probability for two countries to
form any RTA. Concerning democracy, dyads exhibiting on average more democratic institutions have
a higher probability to form a deep RTA, whereas shallow RTAs are less likely in democratic dyads.
Disentangling di®erent forms of regionalism is thus particularly important to understand how domes-
24tic institutions a®ect the formation of such international agreements. This seems logical in the sense
that entering a deep RTA involves to share some common supranational institutions or public goods.
To give up such a part of the national sovereignty is possible only between similar countries in terms
of political system, form of government and origin of the legitimacy. This constraint is less binding
concerning shallow RTAs, in which more autocratic regimes can retain more independent power while
bene¯ting from gains from trade. The inclusion of these two additional control does not signi¯cantly
alter previous results. Interestingly, the positive coe±cient on the common colonizer dummy turns sig-
ni¯cant for all kind of agreements. In this complete (and preferred) speci¯cation, results strongly, and
signi¯cantly at the 1% level, con¯rm the theoretical prediction: countries more subject to interstate
disputes integrate more deeply, whereas international insecurity reduces incentives to form shallow
RTAs.
2.2 Robustness check
In order to check the robustness of our results, several alternative speci¯cation of the model are ran.
First, to test for any sample bias due to the presence of the EU country members, which belong to
Western Europe an historically particularly integrated region, the preferred speci¯cation (4) is re-
estimated on a restricted sample, excluding Western European dyads. Results are presented in the
¯rst columns of table 5. Our main results remain qualitatively unchanged. In the deep RTA case, the
signi¯cance of the coe±cient on dispute propensity is however reduced, which arises because excluding
Western European dyads largely reduces the number of dyads having a deep RTA. Hence, our results
are robust to the exclusion of the historically and geographically most integrated region of the world,
Western Europe.
The estimation is then restricted to the year 2000. This speci¯cation is thus closer to the model
estimated by Baier and Bergstrand (2004), focusing on cross-country variation in RTA membership.
Time variation in RTA membership is not accounted for, and the evolution of global tari®s is hence
not included in the model. The instrumented RHS variable, dispute occurrence, is computed over the
whole period. Speci¯cation (6) in table 5 presents the results. Overall, results are consistent with
previous ¯ndings. Dispute propensity again a®ects strongly and negatively shallow regionalism but
positively deep regionalism, with coe±cients signi¯cant at the 1% level. However, lagged trade open-
ness is found to strongly foster the formation of deep as well as shallow RTAs. In this speci¯cation,
lagged trade openness is a proxy for both natural openness to trade and the degree of liberalization
of the world trade system. As in preceding speci¯cations, this e®ect is however stronger for deep than
for shallow regionalism. Coe±cients on other control variables remains qualitatively identical.
Finally, the de¯nition of RTAs used so far could induce a selection bias, because it restricts the
sample of agreements included in the dependent variables. Speci¯cation (6) is re-estimated using a
wider de¯nition of trading agreements. The new dependent variables include all trade arrangements
which take the form of Preferential Trading Arrangement and Free Trade Area on the one hand, and
Customs Union and Common market on the other. All bilateral trading agreements are thus added to
our list of RTAs (see appendix B for a list of agreements included). Moreover, a dummy for countries
25ever in a colonial relationship is added. The inclusion of this variable was impossible before because,
according to the initial de¯nition of RTAs adopted in this paper, no such countries entered a regional
agreement. Results, provided in speci¯cation (7) in table 5, con¯rm previous ¯ndings. Results are
thus robust to alternative de¯nition of the dependent variable, such as the wide de¯nition of trading
agreements adopted in speci¯cation (7).






Model: (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: Shallow Deep Shallow Deep Shallow Deep
RTAs RTAs RTAs RTAs RTAs RTAs







(0.33) (1.18) (0.61) (1.31) (0.70) (1.31)






















(0.23) (0.38) (0.22) (0.27) (0.20) (0.27)


























(0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.10)




(0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)







(0.05) (0.22) (0.07) (0.34) (0.06) (0.34)







(0.12) (0.27) (0.11) (0.17) (0.10) (0.17)
Observations 11200 11200 3347 3347 3347 3347
Log pseudolikelihood 3097.1 5873.2 2659.5 3587.6 2359.0 3587.6














Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for intragroup correlation in parentheses. a,
b and c respectively denote signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Intercept not
reported.
26Conclusion
This paper is the ¯rst to investigate, both theoretically and empirically, why RTAs take di®erent forms
around the world. By introducing simultaneously military and trade issues in a model of political inte-
gration, this paper sheds light on the interplays between security and economic forces in the formation
of RTAs. This work puts forward that de¯ning the depth of regional integration by the level of political
integration it entails is necessary to understand the determinants of the form taken by regionalism.
Results emphasize that di®erent kinds of RTAs have di®erent determinants. Countries more subject to
interstate disputes are more likely to form politically integrated regional agreements, such as common
market or custom union. On the contrary, international insecurity deters less integrated agreements
implying a weak institutional framework, such as preferential or free trade agreements. Besides their
potential e®ect on trade, analyzing RTAs as regulation institutions in a world where no supranational
institution enforces property rights is therefore particularly relevant. In order to remain sustainable,
greater national dependence on external trade necessitates guarantees on the continuity of access to
world markets, i.e. that interstates disputes would not disrupt economic °ows. Such regulation is
typically the purpose of institutions, such as those created with the more integrated RTAs.
These results have important implications concerning the nexus between multilateralism and re-
gionalism. Indeed, the positive security externality of RTAs highlighted in this paper suggests that in-
stitutions created along with regional integration are a prerequisite to market integration, which could
doubtfully been provided at the multilateral level. Regionalism and multilateralism would therefore
be complementary as far as the former encourage countries to put less emphasis on matter of security
and to be more dependent on external trade. Our results are thus in line with Ethier (1998), who
relates the recent surge of regionalism to multilateral trade liberalization, and argues that multilateral
and regional trade integration are mutually reinforcing.
Further work is needed to deepen our understanding of the interplays between globalization and
political integration. In particular, extension of this work towards the idea developed by Rodrik (2000),
that integrated national economies, nation state and mass politics de¯ned an extended trilemma, -
only two out of three can be picked. Globalization, because it involves an harmonization of domestic
standards, regulations or tax policies, would therefore comes at the expense of either state sovereignty
or participatory rate of the political system. As it is de¯ned here, deep regionalism can be understood
in this framework as an intermediate organization federalizing national economic policy between coun-
tries whose preference are close.
27Appendix A: Proofs
Defense spending:
Each country chooses its level of defense spending while taking into account defense spending of its





































































































whose ¯rst order conditions give:
d2
(d1 + d2)2 +
d4
(d1 + d4)2 =
d1
(d2 + d1)2 +
d3
(d2 + d3)2 =
d4
(d3 + d4)2 +
d2
(d3 + d2)2 =
d1
(d4 + d1)2 +
d3
































































































































The decision to form a RTA:
Regional integration is strictly preferred to independence if URTA > Uind. From equation 1, we know
that gains from regional integration arise from 3 sources: market size, con°ict and relative defense
48Because opportunity costs are equal on each continent and countries are symmetric, only two world con¯gurations
are possible: one without regional integration and one with one RTA on each continent. For opportunity costs di®ering
on each continent, analytical results can be derived but are awkwardly complicated.
28spending. Those gains should balance heterogeneity costs from integration k, such that:
(Y RTA
i ¡ Y ind
i ) + (RRTA
i ¡ Rind
i ) ¡ (dRTA
i ¡ dind
i ) > k
Substituting with equation 3, 8 and 10, we obtain:









[¼RTA ¡ ¼] > k




¼(2µ + R) ¡ ¼RTA(2 + R)
¤
+ 1 ¡ µ > k
The decision to form a RTA (asymmetric case):
As above, regional integration is strictly preferred to independence if:
(Y RTA
i ¡ Y ind
i ) + (RRTA
i ¡ Rind
i ) ¡ (dRTA
i ¡ dind
i ) > k
From 14, we have:
Y RTA
i ¡ Y ind
i =
(
1 ¡ ¾ + µ(¾ ¡ 1) if i 6= k and i belongs to the Western continent









¼µ(1 + 3¾) ¡ ¼RTA(1 + 3¾)
¢




¼µ(1 ¡ ¾) ¡ ¼RTA(1 ¡ ¾)
¢
else
Defense spending do not vary from the symmetric case. Hence, gains from integration are higher for
a small country entering a union with a large partner. But both countries must agree for a RTA to




¼RTA(2 ¡ 2¾ + R) ¡ ¼(2µ ¡ 2¾µ + R)
¤
+ (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ¾) > k
29Appendix B1: Regional Trading Agreements
Agreement Name Date Type of agreement
ASIA
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations 1967 Political
AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Agreement 1992 Preferential arrangement
Bangkok Bangkok Agreement 1976 Preferential arrangement
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation 1985 Political
SAPTA South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement 1995 Preferential arrangement
APEC Asian Paci¯c Cooperation 1989 Political
AFRICA
AMU Arab Maghreb Union 1989 Political
ECU Equatorial Customs Union 1959-1965 Customs union
CEMAC Economic and Monetary Community 1994 Customs union
of Central Africa
MRU Mano River Union 1973 Customs union
CUWAS Custom Union of West African States 1960-1996 Customs union
WAEC West African Economic Community 1973-1997 Preferential arrangement
WAEMU West African Economic and Monetary Union 1998 Customs union
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 1994 Preferential arrangement
EAC East African Community 1967 Customs union
EACb East African Cooperation 2000 Preferential arrangement
SACU South African Custom Union 1910 Customs union
SADCC South African Development 1980-1999 Political
Coordination Conference
SADC South African Development Community 2000 Free trade agreement
CBI Cross Border Initiative 1990 Political
AMERICA
CACM Central American Common Market 1961-1975 Free trade agreement
CACMb Central American Common Market 1993 Customs union
CAN Andean Community 1988-1997 Preferential arrangement
AndFTA Andean Free Trade Area 1993-2004 Free trade agreement
AndCU Andean Customs Union 1995 Customs union
CARIFTA Caribbean Free Trade Area 1968-1972 Free trade agreement
CARICOM Caribbean Community and Common Market 1973 Customs union
LAFTA Latin American Free Trade Association 1961-1980 Preferential arrangement
LAIA Latin American Integration Association 1993 Preferential arrangement
MERCOSUR Southern Common Market 1991 Customs union
GoT Group of Three 1995 Free trade agreement
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 1994 Free trade agreement
OCEANIA
CER Closer Trade Relations Trade Agreement 1983 Free trade agreement
SPARTECA South Paci¯c Regional Trade and Economic 1981 Preferential arrangement
Cooperation Agreement
MSG Melanesian Spearhead Group 1993 Preferential arrangement
PATCRA Papua New Guinea and Australia Trade and 1977 Free trade agreement
Commercial Relation Agreement
EUROPE
Benelux Benelux 1947 Custom Union (1947-1960),
then Common Market
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community 1952-2002 Political
EEC European Communities 1958-1991 Custom Union
ECCU Custom Unions EU-Malta (a), 1971(a), Custom Union
Cyprus (b) and Turkey (c) 1973(b), 1996(c)
EU European Union 1992 Common Market
EEA European Economic Area 1994 Common Market
EFTA European Free Trade Agreement 1960 Free trade agreement
CZSK Custom Union Czech Republic-Slovakia 1993 Custom Union
BAFTA Baltic Free Trade Area 1994-2004 Free trade agreement
CEFTA Central European Free Trade Agreement 1993 Free trade agreement
CMEA Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 1949-1990 Preferential arrangement
CENTRAL ASIA
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 1995 Free trade agreement
EAEC Eurasian Economic Community 1997 Customs union
RCD Regional Cooperation for Development 1965-1979 Political
ECO Economic Cooperation Organization 1992 Preferential arrangement
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council 1984 Preferential arrangement
OTHERS
PTN Protocol relating to Trade Negotiations 1973 Preferential arrangement
among Developing Countries
GSTP General System of Trade Preferences 1989 Preferential arrangement
among Developing Countries
TRIPARTITE Tripartite Agreement 1968 Preferential arrangement
30Appendix B2: Bilateral Trading Agreements
Agreement Year of entry
into force
Agreement Year of entry
into force
Bulgaria - Turkey 1999 EU - Tunisia 1998
Canada - Chile 1997 EFTA - Bulgaria 1993
Canada - Israel 1997 EFTA - Czech Republic 1992
CARICOM - Columbia 1995 EFTA - Hungary 1993
CARICOM - Venezuela 1993 EFTA - Israel 1993
CARICOM - Dominican Republic 1998 EFTA - Morocco 1999
Chile - Mexico 1999 EFTA - Poland 1993
Chile - Peru 1998 EFTA - Romania 1993
Chile - Bolivia 1993 EFTA - Turkey 1992
Chile - Colombia 1994 Hungary - Israel 1998
Chile - Venezuela 1993 Hungary - Turkey 1998
Czech Republic - Israel 1997 India - Sri Lanka 1998
Czech Republic - Turkey 1998 India - Nepal 1996
EU - Bulgaria 1994 Israel - Turkey 1997
EU - Czech Republic 1992 MERCOSUR - Chile 1996
EU - Egypt 1977 MERCOSUR - Bolivia 1996
EU - Hungary 1992 Mexico - Israel 2000
EU - Israel 2000 Mexico - Bolivia 1995
EU - Mexico 2000 Mexico - Costa Rica 1995
EU - Morocco 2000 Mexico - Nicaragua 1998
EU - Poland 1992 Poland - Israel 1998
EU - Romania 1993 Poland - Turkey 2000
EU - South Africa 2000 Romania - Turkey 1998
EU - Switzerland 1973 United States - Israel 1985
31Appendix C: First stage regressions
Table 6: First stage estimates
Dependent variable: Propensity to dispute
Second stage dependent variable: rtad rtal








Avg multi. trade (1960) -0.01
c -0.01
c
(ln avg multi. import/GDP) (0.009) (0.009)
















Common colonizer 0.02 0.02
(0.016) (0.015)










Nbr of observations 12445 12445
Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for intragroup
correlation in parentheses. a, b and c respectively
denote signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Time
dummies are not reported.
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